Mary Cummins, Real Estate Appraiser, Los Angeles, California

Mary Cummins, Real Estate Appraiser, Los Angeles, California
Mary Cummins, Real Estate Appraiser, Los Angeles, California

Sunday, December 14, 2014

Viktoria Modesta, singer, dancer, artist, not disabled, bionic leg

British singer, dancer, artist, bionic leg, not disabled, new sensation. She reminds me of from "Planet Terror," also the lead in "The saddest song in the world." An ethereal, other worldly quality about her. 

Viktoria Modesta, singer, dancer, artist

Viktoria Modesta, singer, dancer, artist

Viktoria Modesta, singer, dancer, artist

She reminds me of "Cherry" from "Planet Terror." 

"Cherry" from "Planet Terror," Rose McGowen

"Saddest music in the world," Isabella Rossalini as Lady Helen



Viktoria Modesta, wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viktoria_Modesta_Moskalova

Viktoria Modesta, Official website
http://www.viktoriamodesta.com/

Mary Cummins of Animal Advocates is a wildlife rehabilitator licensed by the California Department of Fish and Game. Mary Cummins is also a licensed real estate appraiser in Los Angeles, California.

Mary Cummins, Mary K. Cummins, Mary Katherine Cummins, Mary Cummins-Cobb, Mary, Cummins, Cobb, real estate, appraiser, appraisal, instructor, teacher, Los Angeles, Santa Monica, Beverly Hills, Pasadena, Brentwood, Bel Air, California, licensed, permitted, single family, condo, pud, hud, fannie mae, freddie mac, uspap, certified, residential, certified resident, apartment building, multi-family, commercial, industrial, expert witness, civil, criminal, orea, dre, insurance, bonded, experienced, bilingual, spanish, english, form, 1004, 2055, land, raw, acreage, vacant, insurance, cost, income approach, market analysis, comparative, theory, appraisal theory, cost approach, sales, matched pairs, plot, plat, map, diagram, photo, photographs, photography, rear, front, street, subject, comparable, sold, listed, active, pending, expired, cancelled, listing, mls, multiple listing service, claw, themls,

Wednesday, December 10, 2014

Judge Carol Boas Goodson, reviews, judgepedia, robingroom, negative, 170.6, abusive

I filed this today, my amended motion to reconsider restraining order. Here it is as a pdf.

MARY CUMMINS
Plaintiff
645 W. 9th St. #110-140 
Los Angeles, CA 90015 
In Pro Per 
Telephone: (310) 877-4770 

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES



MARY CUMMINS

Petitioner
v.

AMANDA LOLLAR

Respondent
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Case No. BS143169

AMENDED MOTION TO RECONSIDER DENIAL OF CIVIL RESTRAINING ORDER, AWARD OF LAWYER’S COSTS AND FEES, REQUEST FOR NEW TRIAL BEFORE A DIFFERENT JUDGE

Date: August 16, 2013
Time: 8:30 a.m..
Dept: 75



     Petitioner Mary Cummins (“Cummins”) moves this Court to reconsider the denial of her request for restraining order against Respondent Amanda Lollar (“Lollar”) and order to pay Respondent’s legal costs and fees. Petitioner requests a new hearing before a different Judge.
  1. INTRODUCTION    
     Cummins contends that during the hearing conducted on her section 527.6 petition, the trial judge exhibited bias against her in violation of her constitutional due process right to a fair trial. Cummins further argues that the trial judge engaged in acts of judicial misconduct and committed errors of law that deprived her of a fair trial. Therefore a new hearing is warranted under Cal. Civ. Code of Proc. §  657 due to irregularities in the section 527.6 hearing and the court's erroneous exclusion of evidence. Cummins requests to remand the matter for a new trial/hearing in front of a new judge. Cummins gives notice that she will be recording audio and/or video of the hearing. 
      SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS

    Cummins has gone through the police academy, Humane Academy to become a Humane Officer. Cummins is on the Humane Society of the United States animal cruelty and rescue team which investigates and reports animal cruelty. 
    Cummins was invited to intern with Lollar at Bat World Sanctuary in Texas. Cummins went to Texas June 19 to June 28, 2010. Instead of learning advanced bat care she witnessed and documented animal cruelty, animal neglect, violations of the Animal Welfare Act and other violations.  
    Cummins left early and reported Lollar to authorities giving them photos and videos besides the result of an investigation to authorities. Lollar was investigated. Violations were found. A USDA veterinarian stated in writing that Lollar caused bats “pain, suffering” and “death.” USDA stated in writing she violated the Animal Welfare Act. Texas Parks & Wildlife Department also stated in writing that Lollar violated their regulations.
     In retaliation for Cummins reporting Lollar to authorities, Lollar has been harassing, cyberstalking, stalking, defaming, libeling, slandering, threatening, inciting others to harass, paying others to harass and assault, filing false reports with government agencies against Cummins ... since July 2010 to the present.
     Lollar hired Robert Young to serve documents on Cummins February 17, 2013. Lollar’s attorney stated in writing he did not send the process server. He filed a notice of inability to serve January 3, 2013 and was done with the case. 
     Cummins was preparing a private hall for the LA City Mayoral Convention. Young trespassed into the closed private room, tried to lure Cummins out of the room under false pretense, videotaped Cummins against her will openly and also with a hidden camera then struck Cummins with documents. Lollar then posted the edited video online without Cummins’ permission. It was removed by YouTube as a “depiction of violence.” Cummins retained a copy. Cummins filed a police report against Lollar and Young for assault report # 131506821. Young admitted to the police he was paid by Lollar to do this.
     Since then Lollar tried to access Cummins’ bank accounts pretending to be Cummins using her social security number and personal identifying information obtained illegally. The bank denied Lollar access and played the audio tape of the phone call to Cummins who recognized Lollar’s voice. Cummins filed another police report for identity theft report # 130108757.
     Prior to these incidents a molotov cocktail and an M-80 were found under Cummins’ car within weeks of each other but the perpetrator could not be identified. Cummins suspects this was ordered by Lollar but has no proof.
     Lollar posted a death threat against Cummins online which was included in the original petition. Lollar is encouraging her 40,000 Facebook fans to attack Cummins. Lollar is inciting her fans to commit violence against Cummins. Her fans have made death threats. People have showed up at Cummins’ home address which is not public.    
     This behavior caused Cummins to send a few cease and desist emails to Lollar’s attorneys instructing them to keep Lollar away from her. Cummins has informed Lollar’s attorneys that Cummins has a loaded permitted gun and will defend herself to the full extent of the law if anyone trespasses upon her property and tries to harm her.
    Lollar has continued harassing Cummins with a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at Cummins that seriously alarms, annoys, harasses Cummins and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct has caused Cummins and would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress.
     Three LAPD officers, two LAPD detectives and an LAPD attorney all told Cummins that she qualified for and should get a restraining order against Lollar. LAPD stated an order would prevent Lollar from assaulting Cummins directly and also prevent Lollar from ordering other people to assault, harass, stalk, threaten Cummins on her behalf. LAPD gave Cummins printed directions to obtain a restraining order. Cummins went to the restraining order clinic and they told Cummins she qualifies for and should get the restraining order. They read and approved Cummins’ signed forms. 
     Cummins applied for a TRO against Lollar May 24, 2013 and received it # BS143169. Court Commissioner Carol Jane Hallowitz who became an attorney in 1977 signed the order. The Court told Cummins to be sure to bring all of her evidence and witnesses to the hearing to show the Court. Cummins had Lollar served in Texas May 28, 2013. 
     Instantly Lollar admitted she was served with the TRO then started violating the restraining order by communicating directly with Cummins and continuing her harassment. Lollar violated the TRO over 100 times during the first two weeks alone. Cummins filed two violation of restraining order reports with LAPD with exhibits. LAPD instructed Cummins to keep a log of the violations which she did. 
     June 14, 2013 was the restraining order hearing. The assigned Judge was not in attendance. The Court Coordinator Sharon Charles stated an experienced attorney would hear the cases that day. Cummins signed a form stating that she agreed to have Judge pro tem Marjorie A. Marenus oversee the case. Marenus lists as one of her main specialities in her website “Civil Harassment Restraining Orders.” Marnenus has over 25 years of experience. Lollar did not show but her attorney Dean Rocco showed. Rocco requested a two week extension so Lollar could arrange to “personally appear.” Lollar received the extension with a new hearing date of July 1, 2013. The TRO was also extended by Marjorie Marenus.
     Lollar continued to violate the restraining order at least another 50 times. If anything the restraining order caused Lollar to increase her harassment by ten times. Cummins continued to keep a log of the violations. 
     Lollar’s attorney Dean Rocco filed a response to Cummins’ request for restraining order. The response included unsigned documents, an unsworn statement by Lollar and an unsworn statement by an unknown attorney Katherine M. McSweeney. At least 70% of what was stated in the responsive documents was completely false, misleading, besides inadmissible in court. 
     Cummins filed a reply to their response noting the falsities with attached exhibits as proof. The Judge quickly flipped through Cummins’ 13 page reply with 12 exhibits within a minute right before the case was heard July 1, 2013.  Judge Carol Boas Goodson oversaw the hearing and called the case. 
     The court order Exhibit 1 states “Oral argument taken from the petitioner.” Petitioner Cummins was NOT allowed to give oral argument. Cummins came prepared with videos and a two inch tall stack of evidence of over 150 violations of the temporary restraining order. She had another two inch stack of paper evidence and videos of past harassment, threats and the assault. The Judge instantly ruled without allowing Cummins to present her case or any evidence. Judge stated in court she ruled based on the TRO application alone which was only a summary. The Judge prejudged the case. 
     Judge Goodson instantly stated that the events happened in 2010 so it’s too late to do anything. Cummins replied that her application for TRO stated the events started in 2010 and were ongoing to the present. 
     Judge Goodson then allowed Lollar’s attorney to plead his response without allowing Cummins to first plead her case. Attorney Rocco mentioned a previous case between Cummins and Lollar. Cummins stated “objection” because that case is inadmissible as evidence in this case as it is not related. Judge Goodson ignored Cummins’ objection completely, did not even say “over ruled” or “sustained.” 
     Attorney Rocco then referred to the unsworn statements in his reply. Cummins again objected as hearsay. They were not even sworn statements. Neither Lollar nor the other attorney appeared in the case. Even if attorney Katherine M. McSweeney appeared she was not a witness to anything. Again, Judge Goodson did not even acknowledge Cummins’ objections. 
     Attorney Rocco then mentioned a search for the common name “Cummins” in legal filings in all of LA County. Rocco tried to infer that Petitioner was every “Cummins” in the search results to make it appear that Petitioner is litigious. Cummins again tried to object because Petitioner is not every person in the search results. Previous litigation is also inadmissible as it is not related. Rocco tried to portray Cummins in false light by making it seem that she is not only litigious but also loses most lawsuits which is not true. 
     Rocco told the court that Cummins tried to get a restraining order on her neighbor but was denied. Cummins did indeed get a restraining order on her neighbor after he assaulted her multiple times. Rocco’s own exhibit shows Cummins received the restraining order. Rocco, McSweeney and Lollar all committed fraud upon the court in their false written and oral statements to the Court.
     Judge Goodson stated to Cummins that she finds her application for restraining order “annoying.” Judge Goodson also said that Cummins was “annoying.” Judge Goodson stated that restraining orders are only for people who are “stabbed with a knife” or “hit with a two by four.” Cummins then quoted Cal. Cod of Civ. Proc. § 527.6 (b)(3) which states the criteria for a civil harassment restraining order i.e. “‘Harassment’ is unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The court of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress.”
     Judge Goodson then stated that Cummins did not show substantial emotional distress. Cummins tried to plead her case of emotional distress but was denied. Cummins has suffered severe emotional distress as a result of Lollar’s harassment. Evidence of this was even included in the application for TRO. Cummins stated that Lollar paid a man to serve her documents who instead hit her with the documents after trespassing. Judge Goodson said paraphrased “that was legal service. Things get a little physical with service.” Judge Goodson seems to have only read Respondent’s reply and not Petitioner’s response to Respondent’s reply which proves their allegations false.
     Cummins then asked Judge Goodson for permission to ask a question and was allowed. Cummins asked “if I had no grounds for a restraining order, why did the police officers, detectives, LAPD lawyer tell me to get a restraining order? Why did the restraining order clinic state that I should get the restraining order and my documents looked fine? Why did the Commissioner allow the TRO? Why did the judge pro tem agree for an extension?”
     Judge Goodson then stated “The restraining order clinic is run by a bunch of law students who don’t know anything. Commissioners approved the TRO and extension. They approve all TRO’s. They don’t know anything.”  
     Judge Goodson denied Cummins’ request for restraining order. Judge Goodson then ordered Cummins to pay $6,350 in Lollar’s legal fees. Judge Goodson added “you better get out there and start working to pay the judgement! It will follow you for 20 years! 20 YEARS!!!! Mr. Rocco, make sure you give Cummins your address so she can send you the check within ninety days” while sneering directly at Cummins. 
     Immediately after returning home from the hearing Cummins called the court to request a transcript of the proceedings. Cummins was then informed there is no audio or written transcript because there are no court reporters. This was the first time Cummins was notified that there are no court reporters.

II. ARGUMENT
  1. A new trial may be taken from a section 527.6 hearing
     Section 527.6 sets forth a procedure “for what is in effect a highly expedited lawsuit on the issue of harassment” (Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners' Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719, 732 (Schraer )), and “[t]he role of the court in a section 527.6 hearing does not differ from its role in other trial settings where the court is the trier of fact.”  (Ensworth v. Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1110.)   Accordingly, a party to a section 527.6 hearing may move for a new trial.
B. Claim of Bias In Violation of Constitutional Due Process

     Cummins’ federal constitutional rights to due process were violated because the trial judge was biased against her as evidenced by the Judge’s behavior during the hearing.  Judge Boas was hostile towards Cummins, interfered with her attempt to give oral argument, ridiculed her testimony, questioned her argumentatively and admonished her about another unrelated case. The Judge’s behavior demonstrated that the judge was biased against her, in violation of her constitutional rights to due process.
     “ ‘A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’   [Citation.]”  (People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 1000 (Freeman ).)   The federal due process clause requires reversal based on judicial bias where there exists “ ‘ “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker [that] is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” ’ ”  (Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 996, quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. (2009) 556 U.S. _, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2257.) 3  It is only “the exceptional case presenting extreme facts where a due process violation will be found.”  (Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1005.)
     It is not necessary to show that Cummins’ constitutional due process rights were violated as a result of the trial judge's alleged bias against her.  “It is a well-settled rule that if statutory relief is adequate, it is unnecessary and inappropriate for a court to reach constitutional issues.”  (Americans for Safe Access v. County of Alameda (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1295;  see Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 1, 17, fn.   13 [“As a prudential matter, we routinely decline to address constitutional questions when it is unnecessary to reach them.”].) Such judicial restraint is warranted here, because, as further discussed below, a new trial is mandated under section 657 and a new judge should preside over the retrial. 
     There are grounds for granting a new trial (ABF Capital Corp. v. Berglass (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 825, 832.)
C. Errors Alleged to Justify a New Trial Under Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 657

     A new trial is warranted due to “[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.” (§ 657, subd. (1).)     
     “Irregularities” in the proceedings and errors of law were committed by the court. (Estate of Friedman (1918) 178 Cal. 27, 39 [“On a motion for a new trial, upon the ground of irregularities in the proceedings of the court, we are dealing with those irregularities, and it is immaterial whether they result from bias and prejudice or not.”];  Develop–Amatic Engineering v. Republic Mortgage Co. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 143, 150.)
     There were numerous acts of judicial misconduct that prevented Cummins from fairly presenting her case, including the court's prejudging of the case;  its “assumption of the role of de facto counsel for [Lollar],” including by aggressively cross-examining and repeatedly expressing skepticism of her testimony;  its constant interruptions preventing Cummins from presenting her case;  and the refusal to allow Cummins to give oral testimony/argument and present evidence to the court. 
     A new trial should be granted based on the trial court's “error in law” in improperly excluding evidence of events prior to 2013 to show a “course of conduct” justifying a permanent injunction under section 527.6. (§ 657, subd. (7);  § 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)
1. Irregularities in the Section 527.6 Proceeding

    The purpose of a section 527.6 hearing is to determine whether the plaintiff can prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that he or she is the victim of harassment justifying a permanent injunction against the harasser. (§ 527.6, subd. (d).)  Section 527.6 defines harassment as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.   The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the plaintiff.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b).)  A “course of conduct” is further defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)
     There were indeed “irregularities” in the manner in which the court conducted the proceeding that interfered with Cummins’ right to a fair hearing on the question whether Lollar engaged in a willful and harassing course of conduct that reasonably caused her emotional distress.
       The Courts have significant leeway to control the conduct of a trial.  (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1108.)   In particular, we note that section 527.6 expressly authorizes courts to make an “independent inquiry” during a hearing to determine whether an injunction prohibiting harassment should be issued. (§ 527.6. subd. (d).)  Further, “[m]ere expressions of opinion by a trial judge based on actual observation of the witnesses and evidence in the courtroom” should not be the basis for reversing a judgment.  (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1111.)   However, in this hearing, the court exceeded the bounds of reasonable conduct for a judge seeking to exercise control of the proceedings and reach a fair and efficient result.
     First, the July 1, 2013 hearing strongly suggests that the trial judge prejudged the case.   (McVey v. McVey (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 120, 123 [“A trial judge should not prejudge the issues but should keep an open mind until all of the evidence is presented to him.”].) In Murr v. Murr, a non-jury divorce proceeding, the judge was found to have committed judicial misconduct in prejudging the case.   (Murr v. Murr (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 511, 521 (Murr ).) 
     In fact in Respondent’s reply to Petitioner’s motion to reconsider Respondent stated  pg 2 ”Judge (sic) Goodman denied the RRO on the face of the application itself.” Respondent admits that Judge Goodson prejudged the case before Petitioner was able to present her evidence and argue her case. 
     Immediately after the trial started, the judge stated to Cummins:  “You are annoying. I find your application for restraining order annoying” and “restraining orders are not for two people who just don’t like each other.” The trial judge here seemed similarly predisposed to rule against Cummins based on a preconceived notion that the case involved run-of-the-mill disputes between two individuals, as opposed to harassment that deserved to be enjoined. 
     The hearing suggests the trial judge had already made up her mind before the testimony even began that the case was a waste of time. The court interrupted Cummins repeatedly.
     As in Murr, the court's many “ill-advised and unnecessary comments establish definitely that [she] did not consider that the issues presented by plaintiff were worthy of consideration.”  (Murr, supra, 87 Cal.App.2d at p. 520.)
     When Cummins who is pro se tried to present her case, the court essentially took over the examination, questioning her in a one-sided manner and characterizing her testimony to fit the court's view that Cummins’ request for an injunction was motivated solely by minor personal disputes, rather than a fear of continued harassment. Cummins acknowledges that “ ‘ “if a judge desires to be further informed on certain points mentioned in the testimony it is entirely proper for him to ask proper questions for the purpose of developing all the facts in regard to them.   Considerable latitude is allowed the judge in this respect as long as a fair trial is indicated [to both parties].” ’ ”  (Conservatorship of Pamela J. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 807, 827.)   Moreover, in a nonjury trial a judge may have greater leeway to examine witnesses than in a jury trial, and particularly so here, given the court's authority under section 527.6 to “make an independent inquiry.” (§ 527.6, subd. (d).)  But the inquiry must be reasonable and respectful.   Here, the Judge cut off Cummins, belittled her, and mischaracterized her testimony while questioning her in a way that was not consistent with permitting her to present her case. The Judge clearly abused its discretion.
      Cummins attempted to testify about other events such as a death threat Lollar made personally over the phone but was again cut off. Cummins stated that Lollar hired a process server who hit her with documents. Cummins tried to submit the video of the assault but the Judge refused. The Judge dismissed her statement by saying “serving documents can get physical.” 
     Repeatedly, the court cut off Cummins’ attempt to give testimony on other incidents and the reasons Cummins was afraid of Lollar, inserting comments such as “that’s just defamation, libel. Go sue her for it.” Cummins wanted to present the defamatory and libelous blogs to show a “continued course of conduct” of “harassment” that “serves no legitimate purposed.” Cummins also had evidence of over 150 violations of the TRO, police reports which she tried to present but was denied. Looking at the examination of Cummins as a whole, Cummins was not given a fair opportunity to present her case for an injunction preventing harassment.
     Respondent’s attorney stated in court documents that Cummins applied for a restraining order against her neighbor and did not receive it. Cummins did indeed receive the restraining order as evidenced by Respondent’s own Exhibit C. Lollar stated she never contacted Cummins which is completely untrue. Lollar sent many, many emails and comments to Cummins which Cummins brought to the hearing but was not allowed to present. Lollar stated she did not post a death threat yet in sworn deposition Cummins submitted as an Exhibit Lollar admitted that she did. Lollar stated that documents were dropped at Cummins’ feet when Cummins was actually hit with the documents as evidenced by video which Cummins linked to in her TRO application but was not allowed to present at the hearing. Lollar was not even a witness to the event and therefore could not give that testimony as it is hearsay. 
     Respondent’s attorney stated in court documents that Cummins accused attorney Randy Turner of placing an incendiary device under Cummins’ car. Cummins NEVER stated this. McSweeney’s Exhibit L transcript from hearing minutes clearly shows Cummins never stated this and McSweeney misquoted the court transcript. Respondent repeatedly committed fraud upon the court by misstating the facts of the matter and intentionally lying to the court.
     In this case Respondent did not even appear at the hearing. At the previous hearing Respondent’s attorney requested a continuance so Respondent could arrange to physically appear. There was no indication that Respondent would not appear. Cummins was not allowed to examine Respondent at the hearing. The Judge was not able to question Respondent. The Judge relied upon the unsworn statement written by Respondent and an attorney. The unsworn statements contained many completely false statements which Cummins was not allowed to refute and prove in court with her evidence which she was not allowed to submit.
     Cummins tried to object and stated “objection” to Respondent’s attorney Dean Rocco presenting unsworn statements as evidence, bringing up unrelated civil cases ... but the Judge did not even acknowledge her objections. The Judge replied with “let the man (Respondent’s attorney Rocco) speak.” Relying on the principle that “a judge's examination of a witness may not be assigned as error on appeal where no objection was made when the questioning occurred” (People v. Corrigan (1957) 48 Cal.2d 551, 556) Cummins did indeed object and has not forfeited the claimed error.
     After the Judge did not respond to Cummins’ first two objections Cummins gave up trying to object. Given the tenor of these proceedings, inserting objections each time the court interrupted and took over the questioning would have been futile.  (People v. Sturm (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1218, 1237;  Haluck v. Ricoh Electronics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 994, 1007.)
     The Court’s repeated criticisms of Cummins further prevented Cummins from properly putting on her case.  (See Murr, supra, 87 Cal.App.2d at pp. 517–521.)  The court's treatment of Cummins throughout the hearing was “the antithesis of judicial decorum and courtesy.”   (Haluck v. Ricoh Electronics, Inc., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1003.) 
     The Judge’s prejudgment of the case, her improper questioning and mischaracterizing of Cummins’ testimony, and her pattern of hostility towards Cummins constituted judicial misconduct and “irregularities” in the proceedings.

2. Errors in Law

    Cummins also contends that a new trial must be granted because the court committed an “error in law” in improperly excluding evidence of harassing incidents prior to 2013. (§ 657, subd. (7).) 5  The trial court's exclusion of evidence was an abuse of discretion.  (Tudor Ranches, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1431.)
     Section 527.6 directs the court to “receive any testimony that is relevant” at the hearing on a petition for a permanent injunction against harassment. (§ 527.6, subd. (d).)  As discussed above, under section 527.6, harassment may consist of “a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose,” and that reasonably causes the plaintiff to suffer substantial emotional distress. (§ 527.6, subd. (b).)  A course of conduct is further defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)   Thus, in a section 527.6 hearing, the court is “required to receive relevant testimony” regarding the alleged “course of conduct,” “subject only to such reasonable limitations as are necessary to conserve the expeditious nature of the harassment procedure set forth by ․ section 527.6.”  (Schraer, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 730, 733, fn. 6.)
     The incidents forming the basis for Cummins’ application for a restraining order first began in 2010.  The Judge tried to immediately rule that the events all took place in 2010. Cummins stated they started in 2010 and continued to today. The trial court arbitrarily limited the evidence regarding instances of harassment to the time immediately prior to the date the TRO was entered.
     The trial court's ruling hampered Cummins’ ability to prove a “pattern of harassment” or “course of conduct.”   The trial court committed an “error in law” in categorically excluding evidence of these prior events to establish a pattern of harassing conduct, without any articulation of a reasonable basis for such a ruling.
     Judge Goodson stated in the hearing that restraining orders are only for “people who have been stabbed with a knife” or “hit with a two by four.” The Court ruled that restraining orders are only granted when there has been physical violence.  That is an incorrect interpretation of section 527.6. Under section 527.6, harassment may consist of “a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose,” and that reasonably causes the plaintiff to suffer substantial emotional distress. (§ 527.6, subd. (b).). 
     Lollar has been harassing Cummins since July 2010. The attacks have been escalating and have become physical. Lollar paid a man to assault Cummins. Lollar threatened to kill Cummins on the phone. Lollar is inciting her Facebook fans to commit violence against Cummins. Lollar has been committing criminal acts such as trying to access Cummins’ bank account. Lollar’s behavior is indeed civil harassment as per section 527.6.
     In fact in Respondent’s reply to Petitioner’s motion to reconsider pg 5, 6 Respondent falsely stated that it is “Petitioner who has made threats of violence against Respondent.” Again, Respondent is committing fraud upon the court. Petitioner has clearly stated in communications to Respondent’s attorney that she fears for her life and has a gun to protect herself from Respondent, “Cummins has informed Lollar’s attorneys that Cummins has a loaded permitted gun and will defend herself to the full extent of the law if anyone trespasses upon her property and tries to harm her.” Cummins has not made threats of violence against Petitioner. Cummins has clearly stated she fears for her life. In Respondent’s Exhibit 3 C from the same reply Petitioner states “I am prepared to legally defend myself against this crazy person.” Legally defending oneself is not a threat of illegal violence.
     Not only did the Court incorrectly misstate the law at Cummins’ hearing by stating there must be physical violence but previously Judge Goodson awarded restraining orders when there was NO physical violence involved. 
     (Case #BS140742) LAPD Chief Charlie Beck’s wife Cindy Beck v Veronica Roberts, January 9, 2013. Homeless person Veronica Roberts phoned Cindy Beck stating the police chief was following and harassing her demanding that he stop. Roberts later threatened to kill Cindy Beck on the phone. Judge Goodson stated “There doesn’t appear to be any reason why the restraining order should not be granted. In fact, it appears appropriate.”
     (Case #BS141503) County of Los Angeles v Hashim Mwamba Bomani, March 6, 2013. Bomani merely ranted about an employee and the agency online. Judge Goodson stated while she found his postings “insulting and libelous,” they didn't "rise to the level of a threat." However, Goodson added, "I'm concerned about this guy." Judge Goodson ordered Bomani to stay away from the agency and three employees.
     Judge Goodson granted restraining orders for people and entities associated with Los Angeles city and county government when there was no physical violence involved. The fact that Judge Goodson granted restraining orders in these two cases that did not involve physical violence, clearly shows the Court’s bias against Cummins and commission of error in law.
     Judge Goodson has a history of being biased and committing errors of law. In an almost identical court proceeding (Radha Bharadwaj v William Mears, Case # B222911, 2011) Judge Goodson denied Petitioner Bharadwaj a restraining order and ordered her to pay respondent’s legal fees. Bharadwaj appealed the decision stating Judge Goodson was biased and committed errors of law. The transcript of the hearing contains almost identical language and behavior which Judge Goodson expressed in Cummins’ hearing. That order was reversed and she was allowed a new trial with a different judge. 
     In searching Judge Carol Boas Goodson’s judicial reviews online, there is not one positive review. Not only are all the reviews negative but they are extremely negative. Most of them state “File your 170.6 as to this woman” and link to the actual form. For this reason Petitioner is filing an Affidavit of Prejudice Peremptory Challenge to Judicial Officer as per Cal. Cod. of Civ. Proc. § 170.6 (Exhibit 1).
III. CONCLUSION  

     Taken individually, it is possible that none of the above acts of judicial misconduct or the error in excluding evidence would constitute an error that “materially affect[ed] the substantial rights” of Cummins such that a new trial was necessary. (§ 657).   However, “the cumulative effect of the trial judge's conduct requires reversal.”  (People v. Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1243.)  “The trial of a case should not only be fair in fact, but it should also appear to be fair.   And where the contrary appears, it shocks the judicial instinct to allow the judgment to stand.”   (Pratt v. Pratt (1903) 141 Cal. 247, 252.)   
     The order should be reversed and the matter remanded to the superior court for a new trial before a different judge. (§ 187;  Hernandez v. Paicius (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 452, 455, disapproved on another ground in Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1006, fn. 4.)
IV. PRAYER

     WHEREFORE, PETITIONER MARY CUMMINS respectfully requests that the court reverse the July 1, 2013 order and allow Cummins to have a new trial/hearing in front of a different judge.


Respectfully submitted,

______________________________
Mary Cummins, Petitioner
Dated: August 15, 2013
645 W. 9th St. #110-140
Los Angeles, CA 90015
In Pro Per
Telephone: (310) 877-4770



Mary Cummins of Animal Advocates is a wildlife rehabilitator licensed by the California Department of Fish and Game and the USDAMary Cummins is also a licensed real estate appraiser in Los Angeles, California.

Mary Cummins of Animal Advocates is a wildlife rehabilitator licensed by the California Department of Fish and Game. Mary Cummins is also a licensed real estate appraiser in Los Angeles, California.

Mary Cummins, Mary K. Cummins, Mary Katherine Cummins, Mary Cummins-Cobb, Mary, Cummins, Cobb, real estate, appraiser, appraisal, instructor, teacher, Los Angeles, Santa Monica, Beverly Hills, Pasadena, Brentwood, Bel Air, California, licensed, permitted, single family, condo, pud, hud, fannie mae, freddie mac, uspap, certified, residential, certified resident, apartment building, multi-family, commercial, industrial, expert witness, civil, criminal, orea, dre, insurance, bonded, experienced, bilingual, spanish, english, form, 1004, 2055, land, raw, acreage, vacant, insurance, cost, income approach, market analysis, comparative, theory, appraisal theory, cost approach, sales, matched pairs, plot, plat, map, diagram, photo, photographs, photography, rear, front, street, subject, comparable, sold, listed, active, pending, expired, cancelled, listing, mls, multiple listing service, claw, themls,

Judge Carol Boas Goodson, reviews, bias, negative, robingroom, judgepedia, evil

I am gathering information to make a report to the Judicial Commission about Judge Carol Boas Goodson.  In my opinion she has committed the following misconduct.

• Abuse of contempt/sanctions (She sanctioned an attorney $100 for requesting oral argument. Ordering me to pay legal fees of the other side when I should have received the restraining order is an illegal sanction.)
• Bias/appearance of bias toward a particular class (She made fun of an Indian person's accent in court in recorded minutes)
• Bias/appearance of bias not directed toward a particular class (She was certainly biased toward me in her behavior and ruling as per my motion to reconsider evidence and argument)
• Demeanor/decorum (She was extremely rude, cut me off, would not let me continue, said I was annoying before I even started speaking, she said my TRO application was annoying)
• Failure to ensure rights (She did not let me present my case, give oral argument, show evidence, show the video of me being hit. She did not let me record the audio of the hearing even though the law and court website said I am allowed. I did not receive a fair trial. She also did not rule according to the law,  evidence or even her past rulings. You do not have to show physical assault in order to get a restraining order. In my case there was a physical assault.)

I will be posting reviews, comments and reports made by others against Judge Carol Boas Goodson. I found these in books and on the Internet. I will post links to where I found them.

1. From Google book search: Book: Title "California Courts and Judges, Volume 1." Authors: Helen Y. Chang, Kathy Morris Wolf, Kenneth Jams Arnold. Publisher: James Publ. 1998, 1996. http://www.google.com/search?tbm=bks&hl=en&q=%22carol+boas+goodson%22

Pg 370. GOODSON, Carol. Boas. JUDGE SUPERIOR COURT, Los Angeles County. Appointment/Election: Appointed by Governor Brown Jr. Jan. 11, 1981 (date of oath Jan. 13, 1981), elected in 1982, and reelected in 1988, 1994, and 2000.

Education: J.D. (1970 magna cum laude). Western State Univ. College of Law. Fullerton. (member of school's first graduating class): B.A. (1968, cum laude, Anthropology), Univ. of Calif., Los Angeles (Westwood). (Completed last 2 years at UCLA concurrently with first 2 years at Western State Univ., graduating from both with honors): Attended: Hamilton High School, Los Angeles. Carol Boas Goodson Bar Review (Contracts; Torts; Criminal Law). Fullerton, Calif , and San Diego, Calif., ... Born: April 27, 1947; Los Angeles, Calif.; Married to Lawrence J. Berkowitz, Three children (Caroline, Lauren, Alexander by Jonathan Goodson). Interests: Enjoys children, art, and travel."

"But a lawyer who represents tenants said that in one trial, she treated his client so harshly that the client suffered a seizure right outside the courtroom, collapsed on the floor, and had to be carried out..." Lawyers who represent tenants in disputes with landlords said they think Judge Goodson is "nasty," "heavy-handed," "horrible," and ..."Her fiercest critic among interviewees said, "She doesn't belong [on the bench]. I think she belongs in a prison guarding violent prisoners. That fits her personality. She's...""She is that vicious. Two attorneys recounted instances in which Judge Goodson called them liars in open court even though they said she had no basis for making the accusation. Even defense attorneys, who are much more favorably disposed toward her, agreed that her temperament is "questionable," and "on the strong side," "stern," and "critical." Lawyers said she can be quick to impose stiff sanctions."

Here is a jpg of the snippet of the book. You have to search a few phrases to get the whole section.
Judge Carol Boas Goodson Los Angeles Superior Court photo
A Judge needs to have been admitted to the bar for at least ten years before they can apply to be a Judge, "An official of the judicial branch of government with authority to decide lawsuits and preside over trials brought before the court. The term “judge” may also refer to all judicial officers, including Supreme Court justices. An applicant for appointment as a judge must have been admitted to practice law in California for at least 10 years."

Judge Carol Boas Goodson was admitted to the bar June 1971. She became Judge January 1981. It wasn't quite ten years. I also can't find any legal experience as a lawyer. Why did she instantly become a judge instead of practice as a lawyer? Perhaps she would have learned how to be a fair judge if she practiced law before becoming a judge. I also wonder if she legally was allowed to join the bar when her law school was not accredited. Here are current requirements to apply to the bar. Back then it was probably more difficult. http://admissions.calbar.ca.gov/Requirements.aspx

I would like to note that her father Maxwell S. Boas founded the law school and was the dean. The school was not accredited until partially in 1998 and maybe fully in 2005. How real is her law school degree if she was the first graduating class of a school founded by her father that was not accredited? That means she could only take the bar in CA and most law firms would not hire her. Why would she go to a new law school that is not accredited? Why not go to UCLA? This school also has a bad history with students dropping out, few passing the bar and many not being able to find jobs. Google the school and you'll see the reviews. You can pull up a 1977 article where Maxwell Boas states they don't care about grades, degrees or transcripts when they accept students. He said they want to make "nuts and bolts attorneys, not supreme court judges." You got that right. He said most applicants were rejected from other schools, are 28 years old and have only gone to two years of college. Did he create this law school for his daughter Carol? And also to make money from people who weren't qualified to go to law school, may not pass the bar and might not get a job? Is this like the Barbizon School of Modeling scam? "Everyone can be a model if you just give us money to take classes on posture!"

And it's in Fullerton in Orange County and San Diego. How did she go to UCLA in Westwood and this school in Orange County, San Diego at the same time? Twice as much schooling with a huge commute? They lived in Cheviot Hills at the time. San Diego is 120 miles south. Orange County is 30 miles south.

I tried to verify her education through year books and school records. She went to Palms Junior High in Los Angeles class B-9 of 1962. Here is her public class photo from a public source. Pretty on the outside.

Carol Boas (Goodson) Palms Junior High School, Los Angeles, California 1962
Alexander Hamilton High School was a senior high school at the time. I see no records for her but that doesn't mean she didn't attend. I also don't see any records of her in the UCLA Yearbooks. I just searched the name and checked the rear index of students for all years she should have been there. Her name is not in any of the yearbooks. This means she wasn't involved in any social activities, sports, clubs or sorority. It also means she didn't take the free graduation photo shoot and did not show up for graduation. Maybe she lacked proper early socialization. That is I'm sure one big reason why Amanda Lollar has been stalking, harassing, threatening, defaming, libeling me and sending guys to hit me. Amanda Lollar dropped out of the eighth grade and never leaves her cave. Even her board of director told me she lacks basic social skills which is why they generally do the training and speaking.

2. "Now if you get a limited civil case downtown, your choices are so limited. If you ding Carol Boas Goodson, the most evil, biased judge I've ever seen, you may get this ding bat."
http://www.underdoglaw.com/showthread.php?183-Judge-Ray-L.-Hart-Dept.-10-Stanley-Mosk-Courthouse

3. "This woman is rich bitch incarnate. All she cares about is her daughter and horses. Her husband is Mark Goodson of tv fame. She is pro large corporate parties and very anti-underdog. She will try to set you up and play games. She is lazy and should not have anything to do with the law.

Given the above, she has a single redeeming quality, while her nebeshy law clerk works up all motions and seems to make all decisions in the cases, she will fax tentatives several days before the hearing and you can submit without appearing. The problem is if you do not submit, once you appear at court you will NOT even speak to the Judge. She will not entertain oral argument unless you push hard or cite a statute requiring oral argument on that particular type of hearing. You will be forced to tell your argument to the law clerk (I think his name is John) who goes back into Chambers to see the Wizard (Judge). The law clerk comes out again and says sorry, tentative stands. I think I saw her sanction an attorney $100 who insisted on oral argument before the Judge. File your 170.6 as to this woman."
http://www.underdoglaw.com/showthread.php?21-Carol-B.-Goodson-LASC-Dept.-75

I'd first like to note that this is 2004. I noticed that she used to handle civil matters. Now she only handles restraining orders. I have a feeling that's like being in waste management or animal control in the City, i.e. the lowest Judge position except for maybe traffic. That may be why she's so mean but the book written in 1998 shows she was just as mean back then when she handled limited civil cases. Of course now that there are no court reporters she is free to say and do anything she likes. She lied in my court order and said I gave oral argument. I was not allowed to give oral argument. I was only permitted to ask one question which she didn't even answer honestly.

Judge Carol Boas Goodson is rich and some have used the other word as well. Here is her list of investments in her 2011 financial disclosure. http://www.fppc.ca.gov/form700/2011/Judges/County/A-M/R_Goodson_Carol_B.pdf 
Notice she owns shares of some truly evil companies, i.e. Monsanto, Phillip Morris, Coca Cola... She also owns bonds for the La Canada school system where attorney Dean Rocco's children go to school. It probably also doesn't help that he looks exactly like her nephews one of which is a lawyer. Dean Rocco also used to be an intern at LA Superior Court for another judge.

The addresses of her daughters homes are on the bottom, so is her current home address at 541 S. Rossmore, 90020 because she has a financial interest in the properties. Her father Maxwell S. Boas was a wealthy lawyer and then she married Jonathan Goodson the son of Mark Goodson who made money in the TV game show business. They divorced many years ago. In fact Judge Carol Boas Goodson has sued her husband a few times. She filed for divorce in 1984. Jonathan has a new wife Nancy and daughter who are the ones into horses. Judge Carol Boas Goodson is currently married to attorney Lawrence J Berkowitz. Just wanted to get the little facts straight. I grew up in Beverly Hills so I've run into the family before. Her daughter is Caroline Boas Goodson also an attorney. Judge Carol Boas Goodson was born April 27, 1947. Her daughter was born October 3, 1977 so you can tell them apart. This is all public information found on the Internet.

4. Minutes from the proceedings included in the appeal of Radha Bharadwaj v. William Mears B222991.http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1575708.html Judge Carol Boas Goodson made fun of the woman's accent. That is racial discrimination, bias toward a particular class, improper court room demeanor/decourum, failure to ensure rights. Radha Bharadwaj won the appeal. Three appeals court judges agreed that Judge Carol Boas Goodson did not rule according to the evidence, failed to ensure her rights. They reversed the order. I mentioned this case specifically in  my hearing and the Judge said "I don't remember it." I then stated that three appeals court Judges unanimously reversed her order and the case is identical to mine. Then Judge Carol Boas Goodson said "it was an  unpublished opinion. It's uncitable." Who cares. Three appeals court judges reversed her order. And that is not the only orders that have been reversed. There are many. I may post a few of the  more outrageous ones later.

Go to the link and read the minutes included in the amicus brief on behalf of Petitioner. Here is a summary of the appeal.

"Plaintiff and appellant Radha Bharadwaj appeals from a judgment of the superior court denying her petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 1 for an injunction preventing harassment against her by respondent William Mears.   She further appeals the grant of attorney fees to Mears.   Bharadwaj contends that during the hearing conducted on her section 527.6 petition, the trial judge exhibited bias against her, in part based on her ethnicity, in violation of her constitutional due process right to a fair hearing.   Bharadwaj further argues that the trial judge engaged in acts of judicial misconduct and committed errors of law that deprived her of a fair trial.   We do not reach the question whether Bharadwaj's constitutional due process rights were violated because we conclude that a new trial is warranted under section 657 due to irregularities in the section 527.6 hearing and the court's erroneous exclusion of evidence.   Because we vacate the judgment, the attorney fees award in favor of Mears is necessarily vacated as well.   We further exercise our discretion to remand the matter for a hearing in front of a new judge.

Bharadwaj filed a “motion for a new trial and/or in the alternative for reconsideration” alleging that she “was not given a fair opportunity to present her case,” and that she and her counsel “had to fight through a one-sided onslaught of hostility, impenetrable skepticism, sarcasm, mockery, insult and interruption from the court.”

Bharadwaj also contended that on at least three occasions during the hearing, the court “attempted to mimic in a mocking fashion the ethnic accent of [Bharadwaj], a foreign-born naturalized U.S. citizen.”

Only a few minutes into the trial, Bharadwaj's counsel objected, “Your Honor, I declare a mistrial.   You are not letting me continue.   I want this on the record.   I ask for a mistrial.   You know, you have interrupted me at every single stage.”   A few minutes later, Bharadwaj's counsel again protested:  “Your Honor, I haven't had a chance to finish.   Every time I say something, you have cut me off.   I would like to try my own case.”

I'll add more reviews later. I am truly shocked after this appeal that Judge Carol Boas Goodson is still on the bench. I did notice that no one has run against her in a long time. While she is paid $179,000 a year being a Judge for restraining orders probably is the lowest gig in the court house. I bet she was demoted because of her extremely bad behavior. Maybe they hope she'll quit. I bet she originally aspired to be a Federal District Court Judge or maybe an Appeals or Supreme Court Judge. She's a senior citizen and she's just a judge handling restraining orders. Her rulings have nothing to do with the law or evidence. She favors city, county entities.

Mary Cummins of Animal Advocates is a wildlife rehabilitator licensed by the California Department of Fish and Game. Mary Cummins is also a licensed real estate appraiser in Los Angeles, California.

Mary Cummins, Mary K. Cummins, Mary Katherine Cummins, Mary Cummins-Cobb, Mary, Cummins, Cobb, real estate, appraiser, appraisal, instructor, teacher, Los Angeles, Santa Monica, Beverly Hills, Pasadena, Brentwood, Bel Air, California, licensed, permitted, single family, condo, pud, hud, fannie mae, freddie mac, uspap, certified, residential, certified resident, apartment building, multi-family, commercial, industrial, expert witness, civil, criminal, orea, dre, insurance, bonded, experienced, bilingual, spanish, english, form, 1004, 2055, land, raw, acreage, vacant, insurance, cost, income approach, market analysis, comparative, theory, appraisal theory, cost approach, sales, matched pairs, plot, plat, map, diagram, photo, photographs, photography, rear, front, street, subject, comparable, sold, listed, active, pending, expired, cancelled, listing, mls, multiple listing service, claw, themls,

Judge Carol Boas Goodson, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge, reviews, appeals, reversed decisions

Judge Carol Boas Goodson. I've been doing research for my motion to reconsider restraining order and have uncovered some mind boggling things about Judge Carol Boas Goodson. She treated another woman trying to get a restraining order the same way she treated me. I was under the assumption that Judge Carol Boas Goodson just had a bad day. Based on this appeal and other reviews of Judge Carol Boas Goodson, she has a very poor history when it comes to treating people fairly, allowing people to present evidence and ruling according to the law and evidence. I can't believe this Judge has been able to get away treating people like this for all these years.

 
Anyway below is an amicus brief written on behalf of Radha Bharadwaj supporting her appeal. There are minutes from courtroom testimony which show just how incredibly rude and out right mean Judge Carol Boas Goodson is to people. I really find this behavior shocking. I know I have never been treated so rudely and poorly by a judge in my life. I am always polite and professional with judges. Judge Carol Boas Goodson needs to retire.
 
Below is from the original court ruling by Judge Carol Boas Goodson.
0 2 / 2 5 / 2 0 1 0 at 08: 30 am in Departm ent 75, Carol Boas Goodson, Presiding
MOTI ON - ATTORNEY FEES - Grant ed
0 2 / 1 0 / 2 0 1 0 at 08: 30 am in Departm ent 75, Carol Boas Goodson, Presiding
Court Order - Com plet ed
0 1 / 2 2 / 2 0 1 0 at 08: 30 am in Departm ent 75, Carol Boas Goodson, Presiding
Hrng on Pet n Prohibit Harassm ent - TRO is denied.
Below is the amicus brief. 

RADHA BHARADWAJ v. WILLIAM MEARS

 
 
RADHA BHARADWAJ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WILLIAM MEARS, Defendant and Respondent.
 
 
B222991
-- July 27, 2011

David Cohen for Plaintiff and Appellant.Law Offices of Patricia A. Painter and Patricia A. Painter for Defendant and Respondent.Justin Ma;  Caldwell Leslie & Proctor and Albert Giang for Asian Pacific American Legal Center as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
introduction
Plaintiff and appellant Radha Bharadwaj appeals from a judgment of the superior court denying her petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 1 for an injunction preventing harassment against her by respondent William Mears.   She further appeals the grant of attorney fees to Mears.   Bharadwaj contends that during the hearing conducted on her section 527.6 petition, the trial judge exhibited bias against her, in part based on her ethnicity, in violation of her constitutional due process right to a fair hearing.   Bharadwaj further argues that the trial judge engaged in acts of judicial misconduct and committed errors of law that deprived her of a fair trial.   We do not reach the question whether Bharadwaj's constitutional due process rights were violated because we conclude that a new trial is warranted under section 657 due to irregularities in the section 527.6 hearing and the court's erroneous exclusion of evidence.   Because we vacate the judgment, the attorney fees award in favor of Mears is necessarily vacated as well.   We further exercise our discretion to remand the matter for a hearing in front of a new judge.
factual and procedural background
Bharadwaj and Mears are next-door neighbors in a condominium project with two detached units;  Bharadwaj and her husband live in the rear unit, and Mears lives with his girlfriend Odette Leonelli in the front unit.   Bharadwaj and Leonelli were once friends, but beginning in 2003 their relationship deteriorated over a number of property disputes, such as Leonelli's barking dog, overgrowth of foliage from Leonelli's property onto Bharadwaj's property, parking issues, and driveway access.   Mears apparently entered the picture in 2007.
In March 2009, Bharadwaj sought and was granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Mears based on an affidavit she submitted documenting a number of alleged incidents of harassment beginning in 2007.   As required by section 527.6, a hearing was set for several weeks after the date the TRO was issued, the purpose of which was to determine whether a permanent injunction should be issued.   At the outset of the hearing on April 10, 2009, the trial court initially assigned to the case suggested that the parties engage in mediation of their dispute.   The parties agreed to a continuance of the hearing to July 23, 2009, while they engaged in mediation.   The parties stipulated to a stay in enforcement of the TRO conditioned on all parties adhering to the terms of the TRO “in a reciprocal manner,” even though the TRO was directed only at Mears.2  The parties subsequently stipulated to several further continuances of the hearing, with the terms of the TRO as ordered by the court on April 10, 2009 remaining in full force and effect, pending the evidentiary hearing.
The section 527.6 hearing ultimately took place on January 22, 2010, before a different judge.   Bharadwaj's counsel called two witnesses – Mears and Bharadwaj – and attempted to call five other witnesses but the court excluded the witnesses' testimony on the grounds that it was either speculative, repetitive, or irrelevant.   The court further ruled that incidents prior to 2009 were irrelevant for purposes of determining whether a permanent injunction should issue.   The court denied the petition for an injunction.
Bharadwaj filed a “motion for a new trial and/or in the alternative for reconsideration” alleging that she “was not given a fair opportunity to present her case,” and that she and her counsel “had to fight through a one-sided onslaught of hostility, impenetrable skepticism, sarcasm, mockery, insult and interruption from the court.”   Bharadwaj accused the court of prejudging her case, and of unfairly preventing her from calling additional witnesses, introducing rebuttal evidence, and properly examining and cross-examining witnesses.   Bharadwaj also contended that on at least three occasions during the hearing, the court “attempted to mimic in a mocking fashion the ethnic accent of [Bharadwaj], a foreign-born naturalized U.S. citizen.”   Bharadwaj further alleged that the court committed legal error in requiring proof of actual physical violence or explicit death threats as a condition of granting the injunction, and in excluding evidence of incidents prior to 2009 that were necessary to establish a pattern of harassment by Mears.   Bharadwaj did not request that the judge recuse herself, or request that the matter be assigned to a different judge for a new trial.
Construing Bharadwaj's motion as a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the section 527.6 hearing “was not a trial,” the court denied it, finding that it was procedurally deficient, and in any event, “has not stated any new facts, circumstances or law.”   The court granted Mears' motion for attorney fees in the amount of $22,700.
It appears that the court never entered judgment in favor of Mears.   Bharadwaj filed a notice of appeal from three unsigned minute orders denying the petition for an injunction, notifying counsel that the motion for a new trial would be treated as a motion for reconsideration, and denying Bharadwaj's motion for reconsideration and granting Mears'attorney fees motion.   Unsigned minute orders are not appealable orders.  (Palazzi v. Air Cargo Terminals, Inc. (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 190, 192;  § 581d.)   However, in the interests of justice and to avoid delay, we deem the minute order denying the petition for an injunction prohibiting harassment to incorporate a judgment of dismissal and will treat the notice of appeal as applying to that judgment.  (Nystrom v. First Nat. Bank of Fresno (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 759, 762–763.)
discussion
I. Claim of Bias In Violation of Constitutional Due Process
On appeal, Bharadwaj argues that her federal constitutional rights to due process were violated because the trial judge was biased against her based on her ethnicity, as evidenced by the judge's “derisive mocking” of her accent on several occasions when repeating the phrase “focused malevolence” that Bharadwaj used to describe the manner in which Mears allegedly glared at her.   Bharadwaj also suggests that other conduct by the court during the section 527.6 hearing – including showing hostility towards her counsel and improperly interfering with her counsel's questioning of witnesses, and argumentative questioning of Bharadwaj and ridiculing of her testimony –demonstrated that the judge was biased against her, in violation of her constitutional rights to due process.
“ ‘A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’   [Citation.]”  (People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 1000 (Freeman ).)   The federal due process clause requires reversal based on judicial bias where there exists “ ‘ “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker [that] is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” ’ ”  (Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 996, quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. (2009) 556 U.S. _, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2257.) 3  It is only “the exceptional case presenting extreme facts where a due process violation will be found.”  (Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1005.)
It is not necessary for us to decide whether Bharadwaj's constitutional due process rights were violated as a result of the trial judge's alleged bias against her.  “It is a well-settled rule that if statutory relief is adequate, it is unnecessary and inappropriate for a court to reach constitutional issues.”  (Americans for Safe Access v. County of Alameda (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1295;  see Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 1, 17, fn.   13 [“As a prudential matter, we routinely decline to address constitutional questions when it is unnecessary to reach them.”].) Such judicial restraint is warranted here, because, as further discussed below, we have concluded that a new trial is mandated under section 657 and that a new judge should preside over the retrial.
II. Errors Alleged to Justify a New Trial Under Section 657
We now address the alleged “irregularities” in the proceedings and errors of law committed by the court, of which Bharadwaj complained in her motion for a new trial pursuant to section 657.  (Estate of Friedman (1918) 178 Cal. 27, 39 [“On a motion for a new trial, upon the ground of irregularities in the proceedings of the court, we are dealing with those irregularities, and it is immaterial whether they result from bias and prejudice or not.”];  Develop–Amatic Engineering v. Republic Mortgage Co. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 143, 150.)
A. Court's Error in Refusing to Consider Motion for a New Trial
After Bharadwaj filed a “motion for a new trial and/or in the alternative for reconsideration,” the court issued a minute order stating that “the court will be treating [the] motion as a motion for reconsideration as the hearing on 1/22/10 was not a trial.”   Later, the court considered the motion only as a motion for reconsideration and then denied it, finding that the motion was defective in failing to comply with the specific requirements for a motion for reconsideration, and further did not state any new facts, circumstances, or law.
Bharadwaj contends, and Mears concedes, that the trial court erred in refusing to consider her motion a motion for a new trial based on the rationale that the evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 527.6 was not a trial.   We agree that the trial court wrongly concluded that a motion for a new trial may not be taken from a section 527.6 hearing.  Section 527.6 sets forth a procedure “for what is in effect a highly expedited lawsuit on the issue of harassment” (Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners' Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719, 732 (Schraer )), and “[t]he role of the court in a section 527.6 hearing does not differ from its role in other trial settings where the court is the trier of fact.”  (Ensworth v. Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1110.)   Accordingly, a party to a section 527.6 hearing may move for a new trial, and the court should have construed Bharadwaj's motion as such.
We now turn to the question whether the motion for a new trial should have been granted, examining the entire record and making an independent assessment of whether there were grounds for granting the motion.  (ABF Capital Corp. v. Berglass (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 825, 832.)   Bharadwaj argued that a new trial was warranted due to “[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court ․ by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.” (§ 657, subd. (1).)  Bharadwaj alleged numerous acts of judicial misconduct that prevented Bharadwaj from fairly presenting her case, including the court's prejudging of the case;  its “assumption of the role of de facto counsel for [Mears],” including by aggressively cross-examining Bharadwaj and repeatedly expressing skepticism of her testimony;  its constant interruptions of counsel preventing him from eliciting testimony from Bharadwaj and from effectively cross-examining Mears;  and the refusal to allow Bharadwaj to call several witnesses.   Bharadwaj further argued that a new trial should be granted based on the trial court's “error in law” in improperly excluding evidence of events prior to 2009 to show a “course of conduct” justifying a permanent injunction under section 527.6. (§ 657, subd. (7);  § 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)
B. Irregularities in the Section 527.6 Proceeding
The purpose of a section 527.6 hearing is to determine whether the plaintiff can prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that he or she is the victim of harassment justifying a permanent injunction against the harasser. (§ 527.6, subd. (d).)  Section 527.6 defines harassment as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.   The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the plaintiff.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b).)  A “course of conduct” is further defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)
From our review of the transcript of the section 527.6 hearing, we conclude that there were indeed “irregularities” in the manner in which the court conducted the proceeding that interfered with Bharadwaj's right to a fair hearing on the question whether Mears engaged in a willful and harassing course of conduct that reasonably caused her emotional distress.
At the outset, we recognize the significant leeway that courts have to control the conduct of a trial.  (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1108.)   In particular, we note that section 527.6 expressly authorizes courts to make an “independent inquiry” during a hearing to determine whether an injunction prohibiting harassment should be issued. (§ 527.6. subd. (d).)  Further, “[m]ere expressions of opinion by a trial judge based on actual observation of the witnesses and evidence in the courtroom” should not be the basis for reversing a judgment.  (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1111.)   However, in this hearing, the court exceeded the bounds of reasonable conduct for a judge seeking to exercise control of the proceedings and reach a fair and efficient result.
First, the record strongly suggests that the trial judge prejudged the case.   (McVey v. McVey (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 120, 123 [“A trial judge should not prejudge the issues but should keep an open mind until all of the evidence is presented to him.”].) In Murr v. Murr, a non-jury divorce proceeding, the judge was found to have committed judicial misconduct in prejudging the case.   (Murr v. Murr (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 511, 521 (Murr ).)   Soon after the trial started, the judge stated:  “How much more time are we going to waste on this?” and “You both know what is going to happen, so let us get through as quickly as possible.”  (Murr, supra, 87 Cal.App.2d at p. 517.)   He proceeded to make numerous comments to the plaintiff's attorney about his wasting the court's time, including:  “Well, it seems to me you must be getting paid by the hour, and want to waste as much of the Court's time as possible”;  “I suggest that if you have any evidence to prove your complaint that you put it on, and not waste so much time”;  “Have you any evidence in support of your complaint?”;   and “[C]annot you try the case without wasting so much time?   This case should have been tried in 10 or 20 minutes, just like an ordinary divorce case.”  (Id. at p. 517.)
The trial judge here seemed similarly predisposed to rule against Bharadwaj based on a preconceived notion that the case involved run-of-the-mill property disputes between neighbors, as opposed to harassment that deserved to be enjoined.   At the very outset of the hearing, when counsel for Mears advised the court that he had witnesses who would not arrive until the afternoon, the court responded, “I have a feeling we'll finish by morning.”   Before any witness took the stand, the court questioned Bharadwaj's counsel narrowly about some of the incidents that took place, and immediately characterized them as “very small.”
When Bharadwaj's counsel attempted to examine his first witness, Mears, the court interrupted him before he could even finish his first question:
“Mr. Cohen:  Okay. Mr. Mears, I just wanted to –
“The Court:  I want to hear about the road rage.   I don't want to hear about the fact that the neighbors don't like each other.   So many of my cases are cases where people don't like each other.   I want to know how a quasi-criminal event should evolve out of the two neighbors who don't like each other.   I want to hear why your client is legitimately in fear of her life.   Just being harassed is not grounds –
“(Court and counsel are talking over one another.)
“Mr. Cohen:  Okay. It is not how I planned to start.
“The Court:  Well, you know, I think that is where this case is getting off record.   There has been a lot of attorney fees being generated for issues I don't like.   What is the property line?   Who owns what?  ․ Where is the parking?”
The record suggests the trial judge had already made up her mind before the testimony even began that the case was a waste of time.   The court interrupted Bharadwaj's counsel repeatedly during his attempted examination of Mears, making statements such as:  “You have wasted this court's time so far for 20 minutes, and I haven't heard one piece of evidence”;  “I think the record is pretty clear that you have proven nothing.   You haven't proved anything yet”;  and “I think the record reflects you are going for more than an hour and you haven't elicited any information that would support your case.”   As in Murr, the court's many “ill-advised and unnecessary comments with respect to wasting [her] time establish definitely that [she] did not consider that the issues presented by plaintiff were worthy of consideration.”  (Murr, supra, 87 Cal.App.2d at p. 520.)
When Bharadwaj took the stand to submit to direct examination, the court essentially took over the examination, questioning her in a one-sided manner and characterizing her testimony to fit the court's view that Bharadwaj's request for an injunction was motivated solely by minor property disputes, rather than a fear of continued harassment.   We acknowledge that “ ‘ “if a judge desires to be further informed on certain points mentioned in the testimony it is entirely proper for him to ask proper questions for the purpose of developing all the facts in regard to them.   Considerable latitude is allowed the judge in this respect as long as a fair trial is indicated [to both parties].” ’ ”  (Conservatorship of Pamela J. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 807, 827.)   Moreover, in a nonjury trial a judge may have greater leeway to examine witnesses than in a jury trial, and particularly so here, given the court's authority under section 527.6 to “make an independent inquiry.” (§ 527.6, subd. (d).)  But the inquiry must be reasonable and respectful.   Here, the record reflects that the court repeatedly cut off Bharadwaj, belittled her, and mischaracterized her testimony while questioning her in a way that was not consistent with permitting her to present her case.
After permitting Bharadwaj's counsel to ask only three questions of Bharadwaj, the court assumed the role of a cross-examiner focused on getting Bharadwaj to admit that Mears had never physically harmed or explicitly threatened to harm her, which the trial court seemed to view as a prerequisite for issuing the injunction.   In response to the court's questions, Bharadwaj attempted to testify about an incident that culminated in what she considered “road rage” against her by Mears.   She testified that the incident began when she pulled out of her driveway and saw Mears standing on the nearby sidewalk, glaring at her.   When the court asked her what she meant, Bharadwaj stated that he was “looking with focused, monovalent eyes on me.”  (Obviously, the court reporter transcribed the word “monovalent” a term that makes no sense in this context, in lieu of “malevolent,” and did so throughout the hearing.)   The court then stated, “He looked at you in a mean way.”   Bharadwaj attempted to explain that “it goes beyond that,” but the court did not permit her to elaborate, and instead asked Bharadwaj, “Has he ever physically harmed you?   Yes or no.”   Bharadwaj then testified that Mears' car soon caught up to her several blocks away, and Mears gunned his engine, sped into the wrong lane, and intentionally cut her off, coming within a foot of her car and causing her to panic.   The court was dismissive of this testimony, following it up with the question, “Now, but the entire time you have known him ․ there has never been any physical contact between you?”
Bharadwaj attempted to testify about another incident with Mears that grew out of a disagreement over driveway access and allegedly escalated to the point that Mears was swearing and yelling at her and attempted to enter her garage.   However, the court repeatedly interrupted her before she could finish explaining what had happened, mischaracterizing her testimony as establishing only that “there was an argument over access to a parking area that you initiated verbal contact with the respondent and he responded by saying, ‘I can't hear you,’ which you interpreted as being monovalent focus.”   When Bharadwaj attempted to explain that there was more to the incident than that, because Mears continued to swear and yell at her and tried to come into her garage, the judge commented, “Again over the parking?” and made it clear she wanted to move on to another topic.   Bharadwaj managed to come back to the event to add that ten minutes after she shut the garage door before Mears could enter, she went outside to take out the trash, and found Mears still there, yelling.   The court responded, “Yelling that he owned the property and he has a right to the parking?”
When Bharadwaj's counsel attempted to interject a question and asked Bharadwaj why she was afraid of Mears, the court immediately interrupted before Bharadwaj could answer, stating, “He has never touched you.   He has never sworn at you.   He has never threatened you and the most he has done is give you a monovalent look and the finger when you were arguing about the parking situation.”   Despite counsel's objection to this mischaracterization of Bharadwaj's testimony, the court continued:  “The point is, ma‘am, your argument really relates to neighborhood issues and particularly parking, and blocking the driveway.”   Repeatedly, the court cut off counsel's attempt to elicit testimony on other incidents and the reasons Bharadwaj was afraid of Mears, inserting comments such as, “The one incident that was described is absolutely meaningless.   We know that the argument is over parking spaces in the neighborhood dispute and monovalent looks for her psychological fear.”   The court added:  “You are neighbors, ma‘am.   If I gave you a TRO, I can only shudder at the thought how you would be calling the police to have him arrested every time you interpret a look from him as monovalent focus.”   Looking at the examination of Bharadwaj as a whole, we conclude that she was not given a fair opportunity to present her case for an injunction preventing harassment.
Relying on the principle that “a judge's examination of a witness may not be assigned as error on appeal where no objection was made when the questioning occurred” (People v. Corrigan (1957) 48 Cal.2d 551, 556), Mears contends that Bharadwaj failed to object when the court took over the questioning and thus has forfeited the claimed error.   We do not find such a forfeiture here.   Only a few minutes into the trial, Bharadwaj's counsel objected, “Your Honor, I declare a mistrial.   You are not letting me continue.   I want this on the record.   I ask for a mistrial.   You know, you have interrupted me at every single stage.”   A few minutes later, Bharadwaj's counsel again protested:  “Your Honor, I haven't had a chance to finish.   Every time I say something, you have cut me off.   I would like to try my own case.”   In addition, counsel frequently objected to the court's mischaracterizations of Bharadwaj's testimony.   Given the tenor of these proceedings, inserting objections each time the court interrupted and took over the questioning would have been futile.  (People v. Sturm (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1218, 1237;  Haluck v. Ricoh Electronics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 994, 1007.)
The trial court's repeated criticisms of Bharadwaj's counsel further prevented counsel from properly putting on Bharadwaj's case.  (See Murr, supra, 87 Cal.App.2d at pp. 517–521.)   To be sure, counsel's questions were sometimes rather far afield, and thus it was not unreasonable for the court to steer counsel back to the conduct constituting a pattern of harassment.  (People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1111 [“When an attorney engages in improper behavior, such as ignoring the court's instructions or asking inappropriate questions, it is within a trial court's discretion to reprimand the attorney, even harshly, as the circumstances require.”].) However, the court was gratuitously harsh, making statements such as, “Counsel, I am really surprised at the job you are doing”;  “I am kind of shocked [at your questioning] to tell you the truth”;  “You have to be kidding me, counsel”;  and “You certainly did a good job of making [Mears'] case so that his attorney really doesn't have to get him on direct.”   As the proceedings continued to deteriorate, the court told counsel, “You can't put words in [Bharadwaj's] mouth.   You have done a good job of that.”   Bharadwaj's counsel responded, “Is there anything at all good you can say about me?”   The court replied, “No,” at which point counsel renewed his request for a mistrial.   The court's treatment of counsel throughout the hearing was “the antithesis of judicial decorum and courtesy.”   (Haluck v. Ricoh Electronics, Inc., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1003.)
The trial judge's prejudgment of the case, her improper questioning and mischaracterizing of Bharadwaj's testimony, and her pattern of hostility towards Bharadwaj's counsel constituted judicial misconduct and “irregularities” in the proceedings.4
Error in Law
Bharadwaj also contends that a new trial must be granted because the court committed an “error in law” in improperly excluding evidence of harassing incidents prior to 2009. (§ 657, subd. (7).) 5  We review the trial court's exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion.  (Tudor Ranches, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1431.)
Section 527.6 directs the court to “receive any testimony that is relevant” at the hearing on a petition for a permanent injunction against harassment. (§ 527.6, subd. (d).)  As discussed above, under section 527.6, harassment may consist of “a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose,” and that reasonably causes the plaintiff to suffer substantial emotional distress. (§ 527.6, subd. (b).)  A course of conduct is further defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)   Thus, in a section 527.6 hearing, the court is “required to receive relevant testimony” regarding the alleged “course of conduct,” “subject only to such reasonable limitations as are necessary to conserve the expeditious nature of the harassment procedure set forth by ․ section 527.6.”  (Schraer, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 730, 733, fn. 6.)
The incidents forming the basis for Bharadwaj's application for a restraining order allegedly first began in 2007.   Despite counsel's argument that he needed to establish a pattern of harassment prior to the date the TRO was entered in March 2009 and Mears' harassing conduct was enjoined, and despite the fact that many of the alleged instances of harassment took place in 2007 and 2008, the trial court arbitrarily limited the evidence regarding instances of harassment to the three months prior to the date the TRO was entered.
Mears suggests that during Bharadwaj's testimony, the trial court withdrew its rulings excluding evidence of incidents prior to 2009.   At the outset of Bharadwaj's testimony, however, when she attempted to testify to intimidation and threats by Mears for the two years prior to the March 3, 2009 incident, the judge told Bharadwaj that she did not want to hear about events before 2009.   Although the court let Bharadwaj testify about two incidents in 2008, the court subsequently stated it was “not interested” in testimony about events in 2007.   Mears thus incorrectly asserts that the court made an “obvious change” in its ruling excluding evidence of incidents prior to 2009.
The trial court's ruling hampered Bharadwaj's ability to prove a pattern of harassment or “course of conduct.”   We conclude that the trial court committed an “error in law” in categorically excluding evidence of these prior events to establish a pattern of harassing conduct, without any articulation of a reasonable basis for such a ruling.
Taken individually, it is possible that none of the above acts of judicial misconduct or the error in excluding evidence of incidents prior to 2009 would constitute an error that “materially affect[ed] the substantial rights” of Bharadwaj such that a new trial was necessary. (§ 657).   However, “the cumulative effect of the trial judge's conduct requires reversal.”  (People v. Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1243.)  “The trial of a case should not only be fair in fact, but it should also appear to be fair.   And where the contrary appears, it shocks the judicial instinct to allow the judgment to stand.”   (Pratt v. Pratt (1903) 141 Cal. 247, 252.)   We therefore reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the superior court for a new trial before a different judge. (§ 187;  Hernandez v. Paicius (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 452, 455, disapproved on another ground in Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1006, fn. 4.) In doing so, we do not mean to suggest that the new judge should not impose “such reasonable limitations as are necessary to conserve the expeditious nature” of a section 527.6 proceeding.  (Schraer, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 733, fn. 6.) We also do not mean to suggest that Bharadwaj is or is not entitled to an injunction.   We only conclude that both parties must be treated fairly before a ruling on that issue is made.6
disposition
The judgment is reversed and remanded for a new trial, with directions to the presiding judge of the superior court to assign the matter to a different judge.   Each party shall each bear its own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
We concur:
FOOTNOTES
1.  FN1. All references to code sections herein are to the California Code of Civil Procedure.
2.  FN2. After agreeing to the stay, Bharadwaj sought to disqualify the original judge under sections 170.1, 170.3, and 170.6, contending that the court was biased against Bharadwaj and conducted a de facto settlement conference without her consent.   The judge denied the motion for disqualification, finding that it lacked merit, but ultimately recused herself in “the interest of justice” because she deemed it essential that the parties to a restraining order proceeding perceive they have been provided a full and fair hearing.
3.  FN3. California law calls for the disqualification of a judge based on the mere appearance of bias (§ 170.1, subd. (a)(6)(A)(iii);  Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1001), and thus imposes standards to protect against judicial bias that are more rigorous and expansive than the “ ‘ “constitutional floor” ’ ” set by the due process clause.  (Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1005.)   Therefore, most disputes over disqualification may be resolved under California's statutory law and “ ‘without resort to the Constitution.’ ”  (Ibid.) Here, however, Bharadwaj never sought the disqualification of the trial judge under section 170.1 based on the appearance of bias.
4.  FN4. While Bharadwaj complains of other conduct by the judge, such as refusing to permit other witnesses to testify, we find that Bharadwaj has not carried her burden of showing any misconduct on the judge's part in such rulings.
5.  FN5. Bharadwaj also asserts that the trial court erroneously interpreted section 527.6 to require proof of actual physical violence or the express threat of violence in order for an injunction against harassment to be issued.   As Mears points out, Bharadwaj failed to timely request a Statement of Decision (§ 632).   In the absence of a Statement of Decision, even if the record of the hearing indicates that the trial court was applying the wrong legal standard, we must assume that the trial court corrected any error and applied the proper legal standard in denying Bharadwaj's request for an injunction.  (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 269.)
6.  FN6. Because we necessarily reverse the grant of attorney's fees in favor of Mears as well, we need not reach Bharadwaj's contention that the award was otherwise erroneous.
WILLHITE, J.
EPSTEIN, P. J.SUZUKAWA, J.

Mary Cummins of Animal Advocates is a wildlife rehabilitator licensed by the California Department of Fish and Game. Mary Cummins is also a licensed real estate appraiser in Los Angeles, California.

Mary Cummins, Mary K. Cummins, Mary Katherine Cummins, Mary Cummins-Cobb, Mary, Cummins, Cobb, real estate, appraiser, appraisal, instructor, teacher, Los Angeles, Santa Monica, Beverly Hills, Pasadena, Brentwood, Bel Air, California, licensed, permitted, single family, condo, pud, hud, fannie mae, freddie mac, uspap, certified, residential, certified resident, apartment building, multi-family, commercial, industrial, expert witness, civil, criminal, orea, dre, insurance, bonded, experienced, bilingual, spanish, english, form, 1004, 2055, land, raw, acreage, vacant, insurance, cost, income approach, market analysis, comparative, theory, appraisal theory, cost approach, sales, matched pairs, plot, plat, map, diagram, photo, photographs, photography, rear, front, street, subject, comparable, sold, listed, active, pending, expired, cancelled, listing, mls, multiple listing service, claw, themls,